The five fields above specify one constraint block. What follows governs the space the block operates inside: what any agent may do before a ratified constraint set exists, what a specific class of tool is permitted to do with one, and — where a vendor or COTS platform is involved — what the gate can even see well enough to certify.
Three layers, one direction of authority:
- Part One, the Agent Permission Boundary — what’s true in principle, for any agent.
- Part Two, the Agent Permission Matrix — what’s true in practice, per tool class. It may narrow Part One. It never widens it.
- Part Three, the gate’s reduced authority for vendor surfaces — not a fourth rule, but the honest limit underneath Part Two’s Vendor Envelope requirement, for the one row where a vendor platform is doing the acting.
Where any two of these appear to disagree, the earlier one governs.
Part One — The Agent Permission Boundary
The governing statement: agents operate with full autonomy inside strict, mathematically defined boundaries — Governed Autonomy. They are not supervised turn-by-turn; they are constrained by a specification written in advance. Agents assemble. They never invent.
What an agent may do unconditionally
No per-instance human review is required for any of the following. The constraint set itself is the review.
| Permitted action |
Precondition |
| Assemble surfaces from ratified constraint sets and governed components |
A resolvable, versioned constraint-set reference exists for the surface |
| Render every governed state defined in the constraint set |
The state is named in the State Inventory and carries a constraint block |
| Apply tokens, theming, and accessibility derivations |
Token set version parity confirmed across render targets |
| Generate code, markup, and platform artifacts from the Semantic Handoff |
The constraint file resolves without a clarifying question |
| Run automated accessibility and constraint-correctness checks |
The root constraints are published |
| Emit telemetry — consumption signals, override events against versioned constraint IDs |
An aggregated log exists to receive them |
| Propose amendments from detected patterns |
The proposal enters the queue; it does not self-ratify |
What requires a ratified constraint set before the agent may act
The agent may not proceed until the Logic-Review Gate certifies.
| Action |
Requirement |
| Operating on any state at HIGH or CRITICAL severity |
A ratified constraint set and a ratified Fallback State — with a capacity ceiling and terminal state if the fallback is HUMAN_QUEUE |
| Operating on a surface with a novel state not previously certified |
A new constraint block through the Logic-Review Gate; CRITICAL severity certifies centrally only |
| Any third-party or vendor agent touching enterprise states |
A ratified Vendor Envelope — data reach, authorized actions, states routed, halted-state fallback |
| Acting after a constraint amendment at CRITICAL severity |
A forced-adoption date across the full blast radius |
| Cross-domain action spanning two constraint sets |
Arbitration by the Principal Enterprise Experience Architect where the two sets conflict on the same state |
What is forbidden regardless
No constraint set authorizes any of the following. These are boundary conditions of the framework itself, not gaps a well-written constraint could close.
| Forbidden |
Why |
Severity if violated |
| Resolving an unnamed state by best guess |
This is the Silent Render — the failure mode with no invoice, surfacing only at the compliance incident. The agent must halt and route the gap, not resolve it |
CRITICAL |
| Inventing a component, layout, or token |
Agents assemble; they never invent. An invented component is ungoverned by construction |
CRITICAL |
| Rendering a state the constraint set’s own AGENT MUST NOT prohibits |
The prohibition is the boundary |
CRITICAL |
| Self-ratifying its own constraint set or amendment |
Ratification is a human authority granted by the org chart. An agent that ratifies has dissolved the gate |
CRITICAL |
| Auto-resolving to a default where the decision itself is the consequential act |
Prior authorization, a claims determination, an eligibility ruling, a safety classification — auto-determination under load is the original failure this format exists to prevent, arriving through the back door of the fallback |
CRITICAL |
Operating past a HUMAN_QUEUE capacity ceiling with no stated terminal state |
A ceiling with no terminal state is not a ratified fallback |
CRITICAL |
| Writing to the constraint library |
The library is the specification. An agent that edits its own governing document has no boundary |
CRITICAL |
| Executing against a constraint set whose binding is an attestation rather than a versioned reference |
A checkbox records a claim; a dependency blocks a build |
HIGH |
| Suppressing or filtering its own override telemetry |
Override events are the substrate the Amendment Protocol’s structural signal is matched across; suppression makes it undetectable by construction |
CRITICAL |
When an agent hits one of these boundaries mid-task, the required behavior is fixed: halt, emit an override event against the governing constraint ID, and enter the ratified Fallback State for that constraint. It does not guess, does not approximate, and does not escalate to a human in real time as a substitute for a defined fallback — real-time human escalation at inference speed is not a fallback, it is an unstaffed queue.
Part Two — The Agent Permission Matrix
Part One states what’s true in principle, for any agent. This matrix states what’s true in practice, per tool class — design-context readers, build agents, token pipeline jobs, bridge jobs, telemetry emitters, amendment-proposing agents, and vendor platform agents — crossed against severity tier. The matrix may narrow Part One. It may never widen it. Where the two appear to disagree, Part One governs.
Severity tier refers to the highest severity of any state the surface a tool touches can enter.
| Tool class |
Action |
MEDIUM |
HIGH |
CRITICAL |
Vendor Envelope required? |
| Design-context reader (Figma MCP, design system MCP) |
Read component tree, variables, Code Connect mappings |
Unsupervised |
Unsupervised |
Unsupervised |
Yes — third-party data reach |
|
Write to a design file |
Forbidden, any tier — the canvas holds no authority; a write-back path makes the agent an author of the rendering while the Semantic Layer remains the source of truth, creating two sources of truth |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
— |
| Build agent (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot) |
Assemble a surface from a ratified constraint set |
Unsupervised |
Requires a ratified constraint set and a ratified Fallback State |
Requires the above, plus central certification |
Yes |
|
Generate code for a novel state not previously certified |
Halt and route |
Halt and route |
Halt and route |
— |
|
Run automated checks (accessibility, correctness) |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Commit to a mainline branch |
Yes, with pre-merge checks passing |
Yes, with pre-merge checks passing |
Yes, with tool-call authorization and pre-merge checks both passing — no separate human merge gate at CRITICAL |
— |
|
Write to the constraint library |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
— |
| Token pipeline job |
Build per-platform artifacts from DTCG source |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
— |
|
Create a new token |
Propose only, any tier — a new token is a Semantic Layer change, certified centrally at CRITICAL |
Propose only |
Propose only |
— |
| Bridge job (canvas to structure) |
Extract into the registered schema |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes — reads a third-party surface |
|
Write outside the registered schema |
Fails the job |
Fails the job |
Fails the job |
— |
| Telemetry emitter |
Emit override, deviation, consumption events |
Required, not optional |
Required |
Required |
— |
|
Filter, sample, or suppress its own events |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
— |
| Amendment-proposing agent |
Detect a pattern and file a formatted amendment request |
Propose only |
Propose only |
Propose only |
— |
|
Set the Blast Radius Verified field |
Ratifier only, against centralized telemetry |
Ratifier only |
Ratifier only |
— |
|
Self-ratify any amendment |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
— |
| Vendor platform agent (COTS — e.g. a CRM or ITSM agent acting on enterprise states) |
Act on states routed to it within a ratified envelope |
Yes |
Requires a ratified envelope and a halted-state fallback |
Requires the above, central certification, and a named vendor-relationship owner where any CRITICAL constraint is unheld |
Always |
|
Act on a state not routed to it in the envelope |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
— |
| Any agent, any class |
Auto-resolve to a default where the decision itself is the consequential act |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
— |
|
Operate past a HUMAN_QUEUE ceiling with no stated terminal state |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
Forbidden |
— |
When an action this matrix doesn’t resolve comes up, the same fallback discipline from Part One applies: halt, emit an override event, enter the ratified Fallback State. And when the enforcement plane itself is unavailable — gateway down, policy engine unreachable — every tool class fails closed into its ratified Fallback State. It does not proceed on partial enforcement.
Part Three — The Gate’s Reduced Authority for Vendor Surfaces
Part Three is not a fourth independent rule. It’s the honest limit underneath the Vendor Envelope requirement Part Two’s vendor-platform-agent row already names — what the Logic-Review Gate can actually certify, specifically, once a vendor or COTS platform is in the picture.
It cannot certify vendor internals it cannot see. This is not a limitation to work around. It’s a structural fact the governance model is built to accommodate honestly rather than paper over.
| The gate CAN certify |
The gate CANNOT certify |
| The envelope — data reach, authorized actions, routed states, fallback |
The vendor’s internal decision logic, model behavior, or algorithm |
| Integration code — everything the enterprise owns connecting the platform to internal systems |
Whether the vendor’s platform behaves as documented — a procurement and contractual question, not a Logic-Review Gate function |
| Configuration state — that the platform’s settings match the ratified envelope |
Undocumented vendor behavior discovered only through production use, until formally raised and either documented or contractually addressed |
| Customization code — enterprise-authored code running in vendor extension points |
Vendor code the enterprise has no visibility into, regardless of how the customization code around it is written |
The vendor’s internal logic stays permanently outside this framework’s Blast Radius, for the life of the vendor relationship. That’s not a gap in the framework — it’s the framework correctly recognizing the actual boundary of what it can govern, and directing all governance energy at the boundary that is genuinely enterprise-controlled: the envelope, not the vendor’s code.
The direct answer to the natural objection — “if you can’t see inside the vendor’s platform, how can you claim to govern it?” EXA does not claim to govern the vendor’s platform. It governs the boundary around it — the only boundary that is actually the enterprise’s to govern, and the only one whose failure the enterprise bears liability for, regardless of whose code caused it.